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: Combat Stress and Breakdown among Senior Officers in the Canadian Corps

“Completely Worn Out
by Service in France”

Combat Stress and Breakdown among
Senior Ofﬁcers in the Canadian Corps
Patrick Brennan

O

n 26 March 1916, a little more
than a week before his 2nd
Division would participate in its ﬁrst
major battle in the St. Eloi craters,
Medical Ofﬁcer Andrew Macphail
noted in his diary:
Many cases are not to be distinguished
from cowardice. On the other hand
there are cases which approach
very close to madness. They must
be incomprehensible to that part of
the profession which knows nothing
of the conditions under which such
cases are produced. To hold a middle
course is difﬁcult – between injustice
to the man and injustice to the
service.1

Lieutenant-Colonel J.T.
Fotheringham, the deputy director
of medical services for the same
division, was just as perplexed
by the phenomena which he, too,
was increasingly encountering.
He had recently recommended the
evacuation to England of two young
ofﬁcers after their commanders had,
as he put it, found them useless
through loss of nerve. Although
Fotheringham tended toward the
view that personal weakness, or at
least an individual predisposition,
played a role in the onset of such
behaviour, he nonetheless believed
that “psychic trauma is as deﬁnite

a medical…result as physical
trauma….”2
Macphail and Fotheringham were
talking about “shell shock,” widely, if
incorrectly, used to describe a broad
range of psychological disorders
attributable to the pervasive stress
and fear encountered in the combat
conditions of the Western Front.
Although Fotheringham’s “psychic
trauma” stalked everyone in combat,
the popular view is that it was
primarily an afﬂiction of the longsuffering common soldier. Although
junior ofﬁcers suffered as well, this
view asserts, they at least received
better treatment, which is true. Upon
closer examination, however, it is
clear that stress-related “wearing
down,” and even breakdown, could
afﬂict the most senior ofﬁcers, and that
its deleterious effects on the combat
efﬁciency of the Canadian Corps were
probably much more widespread than
we have traditionally assumed.
On 4 April 1916, LieutenantColonel Irvine Robinson Snider led
his men into their ﬁrst action. There
was, of course, no “good” time to
receive one’s baptism of ﬁre, but for
the mostly Winnipeg men of the 27th
Battalion the next four days were to
be particularly horriﬁc. It was their
fate to ﬁght for the St. Eloi craters,
arguably one of the most futile
and bloody lesser battles fought by
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the Canadians in the First World
War. With the high command in a
fog, the inexperienced Canadians
were overwhelmed by annihilating
German artillery ﬁre and cut to pieces
in their muddy, shattered trenches.
The assault ended ignominiously,
with the remnants of the 27th, and
their Western comrades in the 6th
Brigade, driven out of the salient by
a ﬁerce counterattack.
St. Eloi was a colossal “screw-up”
with blame enough for commanders
from Haig down. But it is little more
than a footnote in Canadian military
history, noted principally for the
fulminating of Sam Hughes and the
Anglo-Canadian political fallout
which led to the sacking of the British
Corps commander, LieutenantGeneral Edwin Alderson, instead of
Major-General Richard Turner and
Brigadier Huntly Ketchen, the senior
Canadians whose performance had
been less than stellar. Still, with the
reputations of the latter on the line,
numerous lesser lights were sacked
for having displayed insufficient
“discipline, grit and determination.”
Undoubtedly, some of these ofﬁcers
had been found wanting, and had to
go – others were just handy “scape
goats.” Regardless of which category
they fell into, Snider, his secondin-command, staff captain and all
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Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine Snider was the
well-respected commander of the 27th
Battalion and a veteran of the Northwest
Rebellion and Boer War, but the difﬁcult
ﬁghting at St. Eloi in April 1916 was
more than he could take.

four company commanders were
promptly replaced.3
Irvine Snider’s war was a short
one. He served in France for only
seven months and lost his only
battle. Like so many militia colonels,
1916 had apparently exposed his
inadequacies, and he was gone, never
leading men in combat again. But
Snider’s story is more complicated
– and certainly more poignant. It
reveals much about the pressures
and strains of command, and the toll
it exacted on senior combat ofﬁcers.
Snider was a brave man,
conscientious, and a patriot. A 50year-old homesteader from the
6
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Portage La Prairie district, he was
married and had already done his
“bit” for King and Empire, having
served in both the Northwest
Rebellion and the South African War.
But he was no doubt steeped in the
prevailing martial ethos of the time,
and so he enlisted in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force in November
1914, assuming command of the
27th Battalion. He led them overseas,
supervised their training, and was
by all accounts a compassionate
and respected, indeed well liked,
commanding ofﬁcer. Less than two
months before St. Eloi, Dr. Macphail,
a usually caustic diarist, remembered

him as “a humane, humorous
man, with much good sense and
experience…[who] therefore…does
not need to rely upon the strict letter
of the law [in running his battalion].”
Macphail approvingly recounted the
story of an ofﬁcer of the 27th – when,
one night, Snider’s quartermaster
claimed that the men had enough
straw for sleeping, certainly all they
were entitled to, Snider had roared,
“I don’t give a god-damn for [the
regulations]. Get the straw, and get it
before you go to bed.”4 Such actions
earned soldiers’ loyalty.
What of Snider’s experience
at St. Eloi? By all accounts, even
if no Napoleon, he led his men
courageously. During a forward
reconnaissance on 5 April, he
survived a barrage in which “900
high explosive and 2000 other shells
fell into an area 200 yards by 50 yards
within about 45 minutes.…In places,”
he calmly recounted in a post-battle
interview, “it was impossible for
anyone to live under the rain of
steel.” 5 The historian of the 27th
Battalion describes a litany of horrors
that confronted Snider: the trenches
were in ruins and ﬁlled with British
dead – mud waste deep in places
– incessant artillery ﬁre – companies
pounded and isolated, despite their
commander’s efforts to hold them
together and get reinforcements
forward – 100 exhausting hours.6
The entries in Macphail’s diary make
equally grim reading. “27th taking
the heaviest losses,” he wrote on the
6th, “bits of men sometimes brought
in in sandbags…” And the following
night: “27th have lost nearly half their
effectives.” Three weeks later, when
the broad outlines of the catastrophe
were dawning on the participants,
Macphail concluded: “Our men were
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: Combat Stress and Breakdown among Senior Officers in the Canadian Corps
merely ordered to go into a hole to be
slaughtered by artillery [and] were
quite defenceless.”7 By the end, 230
of Snider’s men were casualties.8 The
surviving ofﬁcers, Macphail noted
poignantly, “are worn, old gaunt men
from loss of sleep and horror.”9
Irvine Snider was one of those
old gaunt men, worn from loss of
sleep and terrible experiences. “My
friend Col. Snider…has gone to the
base,” Macphail reported on the 18
April, matter of factly employing the
euphemism for a sacking. The events
of the “craters” were too much for
him, the doctor concluded, adding
pointedly that “his losses were very
heavy[,] one platoon [having] only
10 men left.”10 Interviewed 47 years
later, one of Snider’s men still vividly
recalled that the blame for the St.
Eloi ﬁasco had been thrown “on our
colonel…and we were wrought up
about that.” Private Pinkham went
on:

command of the 27th Battalion. It
has naturally been a constant severe
strain…Was at St. Eloi during the
heavy action about the mine craters
where his battalion got severely
punished…Trenches very bad with
water and in awful condition with
dead. No sleep for six days and
nights and naturally felt the loss of
his men personally. On retiring to
billets felt naturally depressed and
fatigued – but it was only when he
saw his bed that he went all to pieces
and broke down and cried. Came
to England eight days ago…could
not enjoy his leave. Could not sleep.
Suffered nightmares and thoughts.
No sign of organic disease…

About a month later, a Medical
Board convened to consider his case,
ruled:
That this officer as the result of
service in France and severe nervous
strain has become very emotional

A man might have said, well – as

and is unable to sleep well except for

they perhaps did – he is too old, I

a short time each night. He is easily

don’t know what age the Colonel was

exhausted and has some muscular

at that time – he was undoubtedly

tremor. At present he is quite unﬁt

shaken, as any colonel would be –

for any mental or physical exertion

any CO would be to lose the number

and must have a prolonged rest.

of men he did. Without any chance
of retaliation. Under these particular
conditions…practically…just sitting
ducks…11

Lieutenant-Colonel Snider’s
personnel file states he was
transferred to England on 20 April
because of “nervous exhaustion”–
subsequently characterized as a
“nervous breakdown” – caused by
the “strain of military service.” His
medical case sheet dated 22 April
clearly outlines what he had endured,
and its personal consequences:
Complaints – general weakness
and easily fatigued. Insomnia and
nightmares. Headache, appetite
variable and poor. Emotionalism
at times. Memory loss. Has been
at the front since last September in
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By early October, Snider was deemed
“recovered” and in January 1917
he was posted to command the
14th Manitoba Reserve Battalion,
a training unit in England. Nine
months later, in mid-October, he
returned to Canada.12
Lieutenant-Colonel Snider was an
early, but ultimately not rare, example
of a combat-related psychological
phenomenon experienced on a large
scale for the first time during the
Great War – mental breakdown
induced by accumulated stress.
Never before had soldiers had to
endure such appalling battlefield
conditions for such prolonged
periods. Emotional, intellectual,
physical and spiritual resources were
expended just as rapidly as munitions.
The psychological threshold varied

from soldier to soldier, but there was
clearly a threshold. When pushed
beyond it, a collapse, sometimes
dramatic, was inevitable13 Military
authorities initially tried to deny
the phenomenon, treating it as a
disciplinary rather than a medical
condition. During the Somme, with
its horrific casualties, the British
Army ruled that “any failure [of
unwounded ofﬁcers] to control their
nerves amounts to cowardice, pure
and simple.” The strongest action
against them was recommended
pour encourager les autres.14 But the
sheer numbers of cases, and the
desperate need to recycle otherwise
“unwounded” soldiers, brought the
more pragmatic, if not necessarily
enlightened, among them to consider
a range of “treatments” of varying
effect iveness offered b y rival
psychiatric factions. As one would
expect from the class-consciousness
of the time, officers were given a
more humane treatment than that
speciﬁed for the ranks. This was also
true because the type of breakdown
most frequently diagnosed in ofﬁcers
– “neurasthenia” – manifested less
extreme symptoms and was hence
considered both more treatable and
frankly more credible.
Altogether the Canadian
Expeditionary Force experienced
an officially estimated 9,000 cases
of “shell shock” among its ofﬁcers
and men.15 Overall, officers in the
British forces suffered at about half
the rate of their men.16 Among the
commanders of Canadian infantry
battalions who served for more than
a month and for whom sufﬁciently
detailed records survive, five
percent were permanently removed
because of “stress” and another seven
percent for physical breakdown
with accumulated stress clearly a
contributing factor in most cases.17
One brigadier broke down completely
and at least four more were so worn
out by the combination of physical and
psychological exhaustion that they
were moved out of their commands
7
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general fatigability and loss of sleep
and appetite.”18 Ofﬁcers started out
with several advantages in their ﬁght
against the condition. Normally they
were motivated by a strong sense of
purpose, the responsibility of having
to lead by example. Usually they
were older and more mature. And
as much as anyone in trench warfare
conditions possessed any knowledge
of what was going on, they did.19 But
battalion commanders, brigadiers
and generals also endured a more
solitary existence than those in the
lower ranks, and companionship was
a critical bulwark against stress.20
Exhausting workloads 21 and an
almost paralyzing responsibility no
ordinary soldier faced of repeatedly
having to send men – many men – to
their deaths, where every mistake
cost other men’s lives and even their
competent decisions emptied the

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 2004

before they could reach that point.
Slightly less severe symptoms were
apparent in many other instances.
By 1918, the problem was sufﬁciently
serious – and recognized – that
Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie,
commander of the Canadian Corps,
developed a policy to revive his worn
out commanders and preserve their
hard-earned reputations.
As previously mentioned, most
senior ofﬁcers suffered neurasthenia,
one of the two principal variations
of “shell shock.” The other more
dramatic form was hysteria. Those
afﬂicted with neurasthenia manifested
what contemporary psychiatrists
described as “brain exhaustion” or
a generalized nervous collapse or
breakdown which included such
symptoms as “abnormal irritability,
depression, loss of conﬁdence, loss of
power of concentration, headache…
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ranks, surely added to their stress
loads. And for all but the most senior
– and hence distant from the carnage
of the trenches and no-man’s-land
– there were the elements officer
and man alike faced. Dismembered
bodies, fear of one’s own mortality,
the shock of initial combat for which
no training could prepare, the sheer
terror of the battleﬁeld, and ironically
the cruel torment of having survived
when so many others had not.22
The stress associated with military
administration in wartime and the
agonies of personal responsibility, not
to mention, particularly in the case of
battalion commanders but brigadiers,
too, the risk of death in action, was
accumulating and unrelenting and
exacted a heavy psychological toll
on senior ﬁeld ofﬁcers. This stress
was a direct consequence of both
the nature of combat in the Great
War as well as their long tenures in
command. The former is self-evident
and well documented. As for the
latter, the situation on the eve of the
Amiens attack in early August 1918
is striking. The most senior infantry
commanders had held their current
command (corps, division, brigade)
for an average of 17 months. And, if
one considers the continuous period
over which they had commanded a
unit of battalion size or larger, this
period increased to 36 months – nine
ofﬁcers had fought at Second Ypres.
Among the 48 battalion commanders,
where both physical danger and the
opportunity for promotion were
greater, average tenure of command
was just over 12 months.23 During the
Great War, 40 percent of Canadian
battalion commanders served in their
posts for at least a year and nearly
one in five for at least 18 months
– well beyond the Canadian “norm”
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Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie
(pointing), commander of the Canadian
Corps, developed a policy to revive his
worn out commanders and preserve
their hard-earned reputations.
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: Combat Stress and Breakdown among Senior Officers in the Canadian Corps
of 11 months. And virtually all of
them had been junior combat ofﬁcers
before their appointments, adding
more months of accumulated strain.24
This was also true of the more senior
men. In terms of mental exhaustion,
neither their role nor time was on
their side, and we should not be
surprised accumulated stress exacted
its toll.
Between May and September
1918, Currie replaced three longserving and apparently capable
brigadiers – Robert Rennie, F.W.
Hill and James Elmsley – who had
commanded their brigades for 34,
30 and 23 months, respectively. 25
By the spring of 1918, the 39-yearold Elmsley was a broken man,
physically and emotionally worn out
by service in France. A Medical Board
convened in early June granted him
extended leave in England to rest.
Their description of his condition is
revealing:

Brigadier-General F.W. Hill, commander
of the 9th Canadian Brigade, had been
in France since Second Ypres in April
1915. By Passchendaele in the fall of
1917 his time at the front had taken
its toll. Heavy drinking was but one
symptom which lead Currie to send him
to England.

Currie’s assessment of his trusted
comrade was frank and touching:
The fact of the matter is that Elmsley
is all in…He is one of the most
valuable ofﬁcers I have in the Corps
and one whom I am, personally, very
sorry to lose. He has commanded
his Brigade with most pronounced
success, and were his health normal
there is no one I would rather have
in command of a Division. He is most
courageous and conscientious, but
is no longer physically able to carry
on. Like a great many other ofﬁcers
here, he has felt the strain very much
and the time has now arrived when

[He] ﬁrst noted nervous symptoms

he must be given a change or a very

after he had been severely wounded

valuable ofﬁcer will be permanently

in South Africa in 1900. From

lost to the service. I do not think that

that time until September 1917 he

he is really able to do any work in

considered himself slightly nervous.

England. I think he needs a complete

Following the severe strain of the

change for some months; that he

work in September and October 1917,

ought to go some place where he will

his symptoms became much worse

never even see khaki…”27

[and] have gradually been becoming
more troublesome…

Although describing his present
condition as generally “good,” the
doctors noted clear neurasthenic
symptoms:
Facial expression…tremulous and
changeable. Has been worrying
excessively over routine matters,
particularly having to meet people.
Has been excessively worried over
the ordinary conditions arising in the
brigade under his command. Sleep
is fair, but there are times when he
will be awake for three or four hours
when trying to sleep, in the middle
of the night…26
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Of Rennie’s situation we know a
lot less. Apparently, he was not
medically boarded. Perhaps Currie
simply concluded he was worn
out. The degree to which stress
played a role is not clear, given the
euphemisms commonly used for
depression at the time, at least in
the cases of “gentlemen” officers.
With Hill, however, there were
strong hints. On the assumption
he would receive a suitable post
in England, and convinced he was
not up to the tasks the Corps would
soon be facing, Currie granted Hill
the maximum month’s leave in
May. Effectively it meant the end of
his command in France. Hill, who

had commanded the 1st Battalion at
Second Ypres, took it badly, though
he seemed to accept it was necessary.
In a letter to General Turner, Currie
alluded to the worsening aftereffects
of gassing. 28 But there may have
been a psychological component as
well. Hill, affectionately nicknamed
“JoJo” by his men, had been a quiet,
unpretentious soldier, unconcerned
with impressions, but a courageous
leader in the ﬁeld.29 By the fall of 1917,
he appears to have been drinking
heavily. Although the evidence is
anecdotal, if alcohol helped Hill
cope with the stress of command,
he would not have been alone. Tim
Cook has pointed out that alcohol
was the permitted – even encouraged
– cure for “nerves” in the Canadian
Corps. 30 Forty-six years later,
Gerald Rutherford, in 1917 a young
Lieutenant with the 52nd Battalion
in Hill’s 9th Brigade, remembered
“JoJo” as a “damned drunkard”
at Passchendaele. During the 26
October attack on Bellevue Spur,
9
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Rutherford recalled Hill telephoning
his commanding ofﬁcer, LieutenantColonel Foster, and putting him in
charge of the attack. According to
this soldier’s account, Foster and the
other three battalion commanders
were by this time effectively running
the brigade, and Foster had planned
for such an eventuality. He calmly
put his attack scheme into operation
and the brigade carried it out. The
following day, Rutherford was sent
to Hill’s headquarters where the
harried brigade major motioned him
to a room in the dugout. “There was
a bunk in there,” Rutherford recalled,
“and the brigadier was lying there
and he was dead drunk. He looked
up and mumbled something at me…
It was a pretty disgusting business.”
The young soldier remembered that
Foster always used to say Hill had a
good mind if he did not kept it soaked
in alcohol.31 None of the accounts
of Passchendaele mention Hill’s
drinking, and if Currie knew about
Hill’s problem, he waited nearly
six months to replace him. 32 That

said, the corps commander seems
to have been a very understanding
– and ﬁercely loyal – man, at least
when it came to close colleagues like
Hill whom he felt deserving of his
consideration.33
As it turned out, all three of
these brigadiers benefited from a
practice which Currie had been
gradually implementing and
now, with Turner’s agreement,
inaugurated formally. Suitable
positions in training commands
in Britain were made available for
long-serving brigadiers and battalion
commanders with exemplary records
in the ﬁeld who were beginning to
show unmistakable signs of “wearing
out.” These postings would be for a
set period of several months, after
which, their medical conditions
permitting, they might be brought
back to the Corps. Staying overseas
doing meaningful work protected
the men’s public reputations and
self-respect, and the consideration
likely helped in their “recovery.”
Unquestionably, their up-to-date
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frontline combat experience would
prove an asset in maintaining rigorous
training standards. Currie believed
that such “rest periods” were critical,
had been earned, and would likely
be turned down, so he decided such
ofﬁcers would be ordered to go to
England if it was necessary to pry
them out of the line.34
Like Rennie and Hill, Charles
McLaren had fought at Second
Ypres. A year later, a fellow artillery
brigadier conﬁded to his diary that
“Charlie … has almost broken down”
and thought he might beneﬁt from
“try[ing] not to worry at all about
anything.”35 By Passchendaele, he
was commanding the 4th Division
artillery and during the latter stages
of the battle, suffered a complete
nervous breakdown, the only senior
Canadian ofﬁcer to do so in the midst
of a major engagement. Immediately
diagnosed with “neurasthenia” and
“exhaustion,” he was invalided to
England. Nearly three months later,
he was still deemed to be suffering
from “profound depression” which

LAC PA 786

The First World War battleﬁeld is best known for the damage it caused to
human bodies, but its impact on the mind could be equally devastating.
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Major-General Henry Burstall (right),
commander of 2nd Canadian Division,
recommended that one of his brigadiers,
A.H. Macdonnell, be replaced because
he was suffering a serious emotional
breakdown due “to the severe strain
of war.”
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his doctors attributed to “strain of
active service.” 36 By July 1918, a
Medical Board had recommended
him ﬁt for service, but Currie was
less than convinced, conﬁding to Sir
Edward Kemp, the Minister for the
Overseas Military Forces of Canada:
“I do not think it would be safe to ask
a man who once broke down as he did
to assume any serious responsibilities
[at the front].” 37 Currie had felt
similarly about Elmsley, doubting
that he would recover sufﬁciently
even in six months. Moreover, Currie
accepted the British wisdom that
officers returned to England for a
rest were never as good men upon
their return to the field. This was
especially true, he thought, when
it was a question of nerves and not
just general health. “[The man] might
think and a Medical Board might
think, that he had fully recovered,
whereas the ﬁrst severe battle would
probably prove otherwise,” Currie
concluded. It had to be left up to the
Corps commander, and his rule was
correct – the Corps should “have the
best men available if the best results
are to be always obtained.”38
Arthur Currie’s compassion had
its limits – he would rarely trust
a “nerves” man to command in
battle again – none of the brigadiers
and only a handful of the battalion
commanders so diagnosed made it
back to the Corps, although Elmsley
took command of the Canadian
Siberian Expeditionary Force in the
fall of 1918. 39 But as with others,
he would intercede for McLaren.
He wrote Kemp, pointing out that
“like so many others, [he] is very
anxious to continue serving in some
capacity until the close of the war,”
and “remembering [his] faithful
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service of more than two and a half
years, I venture to make a plea on
his behalf.”40 Knowing “that we were
anxious to use his services” would,
Currie was hopeful, “assist very
much in his recovery.”41 Eight months
later, when command of the Reserve
Artillery Depot at Witley came
open, Turner appointed McLaren
to command it, largely on Currie’s
recommendation. Like Currie, Turner
felt such appointments must work
to the good of the Corps – the wellbeing of men like McLaren had to be
a secondary consideration – but “the
prospect of work,” Turner happily
conﬁded to Currie, already appeared
to be “doing him some good.”42
Even before McLaren, Currie
had to deal with other cases. In July
1917 Henry Burstall, the 2nd Division
commander, recommended Currie
replace Brigadier A.H. Macdonell.
Macdonell, Burstall argued, “has not
the ability to command a brigade in

the ﬁeld,” an opinion he had drawn
from the brigade’s poor performance
during the Arleux fighting and
equally unsatisfactory preparations
for forthcoming operations.43 The 49year-old Macdonell, a prewar regular,
had commanded the Royal Canadian
Regiment from late 1915 and the 5th
Brigade since the spring of 1916. The
fact is, having served 18 straight
months, he was suffering a serious
emotional breakdown which Currie
was right to attribute “to the severe
strain of war.” The Corps commander
accepted Burstall’s assessment that
Macdonell had to go. Nevertheless,
he pressed a somewhat reluctant
Turner, who grumbled that it was
not as easy to ﬁnd suitable positions
in England for brigadier-generals
as colonels, to help ﬁnd Macdonell
some useful work out of respect for
“his long and loyal service to the
Corps.”44 Macdonell was temporarily
given command of the Nova Scotia
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Reserve Regiment and subsequently
granted extended leave to Canada.
By the summer of 1918, however, he
was using political connections – his
brother was a senator – to press for
another command at the front – with
no success.45
Evidence of incapacitating
stress in the form of diagnoses of
neurasthenia or “shell shock” among
senior Canadian combat ofﬁcers is
not widespread.46 However, given
the ability of many individuals to
“hang on” against the slow wearing
away of their mind’s will to continue,
and the stigma attached to “nervous
breakdown,” this would not be
surprising among such a group of
highly motivated and self-disciplined
individuals. That said, there were
many careers which pointed to the
onset of neurasthenia or in which
it clearly had occurred. “As a result
of 20 months service in Flanders,” a
medical board ruled that John Girvin
was “debilitated and his nerves are
shaken – requires a long rest.” He
was sent home to Canada. Shortly
after Vimy, he was back commanding
a company, and assumed command
of the 15th Battalion after LieutenantColonel Bent was wounded during
the Amiens attack.
Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Doughty
suffered severe shell shock during
the Mount Sorrel counterattacks
and two weeks later was plagued by
insomnia and headaches and “was
decidedly tremulous and nervous.”
Two months of “complete rest” found
him “cured” and back with his unit
at the front where he commanded it
effectively during the Last Hundred
Days. His medical report at time
of discharge, however, portrayed a
nervous, irritable man who did not
sleep properly, was easily fatigued,
and lacked any motivation other than
the overwhelming desire to take his
31st Battalion home to Alberta.
Major Frank Wilkin, who
commanded the 1st Motor Machine
Brigade from late 1916 onward,
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became progressively more afﬂicted
with severe headaches after April
1917. Initially it was diagnosed as
a case of “trench fever,” though his
temperature barely budged. By the
spring of 1918 he was losing weight,
was unable to sleep, his memory
was fading, and any amount of work
left him physically and mentally
exhausted. Wilkin was transferred
to the railway troops, diagnosed in
September 1918 with “neurasthenia,
gastritis and debility,” and ﬁnally
sent home.
Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Rogers
arrived in France just after Second
Ypres. In July, neurasthenia was
diagnosed. By October he was deemed
fully recovered and promoted to
command the 3rd Battalion, a post he
held until the end of the war despite
a medical board’s verdict of “general
debility” in February 1918.
Lieutenant-Colonel Elmer Jones
had been diagnosed as suffering
“nervous disability during war” in
April 1916, received 15 days’ leave,
and was soon promoted to command
the 21st Battalion. Save for a period
of recuperation from a severe wound
received in the Vimy attack, he
continued to do so without break
until killed in action at Amiens.
Within seven months of bringing
the 26th Battalion to France,
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. McAvity
was suffering from chronic gastritis
and insomnia which he adamantly
attributed to “stress of service.”
Doctors noted tremors, nervousness
and constant ﬁdgeting as well as poor
concentration. Despite a series of
extended leaves in England, he was
unable to recover, and was allowed
to return to Canada.
Lieutenant-Colonel Milton
Francis served as second in command
of the 46th Battalion during the winter
of 1916-17 and was then promoted to
command the 47th Battalion shortly
after Vimy. Francis lasted through
Passchendaele after which he was
diagnosed with heart trouble and a

“nervous breakdown.” Following
several months’ recuperation, he
returned to France but lasted only
eight days, thereafter holding
various training appointments in
England including instructor at
the prestigious Senior Officers’
course at Aldershot. The citation for
Francis’s Distinguished Service Order
remarked that “his personal courage
at all times has been an inspiring
example to his unit.” Very ﬁt prior to
the war, he was spent at 33. Although
this ofﬁcer was ofﬁcially diagnosed
as “medically unfit,” his medical
board went out of their way to state
that “nervous overstrain” was the
underlying cause of his breakdown.
Staff work provided no exemption.
Major J.C. Ball had arrived in France
in July 1915, subsequently serving as
a brigade major with ﬁrst the 3rd and
then 2nd Divisional artillery from
the summer of 1917 onward. Yet in
October 1916, a medical board had
noted that he was “suffering from
nervous debility and sleeps badly,”
attributing his condition “to [the]
long strain of his duties.”47
Finally, there was the case of
Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Sharpe.
Sharpe, who had enlisted in
November 1915, ﬁnally reached the
trenches as the commanding ofﬁcer of
the replacement 116th Battalion early
in 1917. He led his unit effectively
throughout the heavy fighting of
1917, then temporarily stepped
down as commander to attend the
Senior Ofﬁcers’ course commencing
in January 1918. This ofﬁcer reported
himself sick in March, and the report
of his Medical Board spells out the
price he had paid to serve King and
Empire:
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On 24 March he was given the catch
all “general debility” diagnosis, but,
the doctors noted optimistically,
“was feeling better than on
admission.” A week later, he was
“feeling much better…dreaming a
little and understands the effect his
experiences in France [have had]
and realizes that his ‘nerves’ get him
at times.” 48 Sharpe was detached
from his course and admitted to
Buxton Canadian Ofﬁcers’ hospital.
Discharged 13 May, he was granted
compassionate leave to Canada to
continue his recuperation in friendlier
surroundings. There were no obvious
medical problems recorded at the
time of discharge. Sharpe reached
Canada safely, but passing through
Montreal on his way to his home in
Ontario, he had been forced to stop
his train journey and enter hospital
for “nerves.” As the Globe & Mail
reported on 27 May:
Sam Sharpe…, recently returned from
England, met his death yesterday
morning…by jumping from a second
storey window and falling to the
concrete pavement below. The nurse,
who left his room a few minutes
previously, reported he s h o w e d
no signs of mental aberration, and
talked quite intelligently to her. He
was dressing to go out for a drive
which had been arranged by the
nurse.
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Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Sharpe
commanded the 116th Battalion
effectively in combat but the strain
forced him from the front in late 1917.
His return to Canada did little to ease his
situation and his subsequent suicide was
attributed to his combat experience.

become permanent casualties. As
the war wound down, a formal
administrative plan for dealing with
this was being put in place in what
was an early but effective form of
“man management.”
In retrospect, wearing down from
the severe stress of sustained combat
on the Western Front – whether its
source was one terrifying incident or,
as in this paper’s focus, a cumulative
effect – was inevitable. As Lord
Moran, personal physician to Prime
Minister Churchill two decades later,
but a British medical ofﬁcer on the
Western front, bleakly concluded:
Men wear out in battle like their
clothes. In battle the soldier’s senses
are dulled out, even if he comes out
unscathed, the ordeal will shorten
his life in the line…it is the long-

As the Toronto News succinctly put
it, Sam Sharpe had jumped to his
death “suffering from a nervous
breakdown incurred during his
service at the front.”50

G

*****

eneral Currie was not a
psychiatrist and there is no
reason to believe that he did not hold
the mainstream views of his time
about “shell shock.” That said, his
own experiences in command and
combat – one thinks of his possible
attack of panic during Second Ypres –
seem to have elicited his compassion
toward senior ofﬁcers with whose
psychological lot he could identify
personally. That compassion could
never get in the way of military
necessity, but at least it did allow him
some leeway in handling the cases of
excellent, long-serving commanders
who ﬁnally had broken down or were
clearly nearing that point. By 1918,
the Corps commander had accepted
that his senior commanders, by the
nature of the roles, would wear out –
physically and emotionally – and that
when possible this must be addressed
by some provision for rest, lest they

drawn-out exercise of control which
is three parts of courage that causes
wear and tear.51

Whether a full-blown case of “shell
shock” or “neurasthenia” resulted
depended on the personality of the
man and his inner resources, his
particular command circumstances,
and undoubtedly a large measure
of luck.
Canadian military historians
rightly have focused on the “rabble
to army” paradigm in assessing the
performance of the army’s Great War
commanders – the professionalizing
of the senior ofﬁcers and ordinary
soldiers alike and the continuous
(and steep) learning curve that
this entailed. But as the battalion
commanders, brigadiers, divisional
commanders, staff ofﬁcers and the
Corps commander himself became
more experienced, and the best men
won promotion, the war inexorably
ground on. “Soldiering in France
is far different from soldiering in
Witley Common,” Currie allowed
with understatement in late 1917.
“We have had extremely hard and
bitter ﬁghting this year, and those
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who have survived have suffered
a great deal.”52 There are certainly
more than enough serious cases
revealed in the personnel records of
the Canadian Expeditionary Force to
make us realize that psychological
attrition, too, must be factored into an
assessment of command leadership
in the Canadian Corps.
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